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INCONSISTENCY COALITION AND THE FORMATION OF PRAGMATIC COALITION IN INDONESIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 2020

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ABSTRACT
Coalition formation of the political parties for democratic countries is a routine agenda in executive head elections, especially in order to meet threshold requirements in candidacy executive heads. However, why do the coalitions formed in each region differ, and what reasons that can explain this variation? This research uses the process tracing method and takes cases from the 2020 Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan Provincial Governor Elections. This study reveals that the differences in political party coalitions in the Indonesian context reflect the diverse political contexts and dynamics between the national and regional levels. In general, coalitions in the regions tend to be inconsistent, which can lead to the formation of pragmatic coalitions. The coalition differences between the national and the regional levels occur due to several factors such as the encouragement of political parties to consider the influence of candidates, the core party, and informal rules in coalition formation at the regional level.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Pragmatism; Gubernatorial Election; Indonesian Politics

INTRODUCTION
Political party coalitions can form both before and after elections, especially on pre-election coalitions, which are alliances established before elections to support specific candidates. The coalition formed in Indonesia is unique because there were not the same coalitions formed at the regional level as the national level. For instance, there were two coalitions formed at the national level in the 2019 Presidential Election. The first coalition was the Onward Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju), which consisted of PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Golkar (Golongan Karya Party), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), NasDem (Nasional Demokrat, National Democratic Party), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, People's Conscience Party). This first coalition supported Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who was the incumbent President at the time, having served from 2014 to 2019. His running mate, Ma'ruf Amin, is a prominent Muslim figure and was appointed as the Chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI). Meanwhile, the second coalition was the Just and Prosperous Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Adil Makmur), which consisted of Gerindra (Independent Indonesia Movement Party), PD (Partai Demokrat, Democratic Party), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party). The second coalition backed Prabowo Subianto, the Chairman of the Gerindra Party, and his running mate, Sandiaga Uno, the former Vice Governor of Jakarta.

However, interestingly, in the 2020 Gubernatorial Elections, no coalition was formed the same as at the national level, nor were the coalitions in the nine provinces the same. Nine provinces hold gubernatorial elections in 2020, namely Bengkulu Province, Jambi Province, Riau Islands Province, South Kalimantan Province, Central Kalimantan Province, North Kalimantan Province, North Sulawesi Province, Central Sulawesi Province, and West Sumatra Province. Geographically, these provinces are part of three large islands in Indonesia, Sumatra Island, Kalimantan Island, and Sulawesi Island.

Each party in some of these provinces has the same identity and platform as their respective parties at the national level, but why are there differences in coalition decisions at the national level and in each region? It was expected that the political alliances formed during the 2019 Presidential Election would remain consistent in subsequent elections, such as the 2020 Gubernatorial Elections. The expectation was that these national-level coalitions would influence regional party decisions, leading to similar alliances at the regional level. However, this did not turn out to be the case. None of the coalitions formed during the 2020

Gubernatorial Elections mirrored those from the 2019 Presidential Election. As evidence, We take examples from three provinces on different islands:

- Kalimantan Island: in South Kalimantan Province, there are two coalitions, the first coalition consists of Golkar, PDIP, PAN, PKS, PKB, and Nasdem, then, the second coalition consists of Gerindra, PPP, Democrat.
- Sumatra Island: in Jambi Province there are three coalitions, the first coalition, PDIP and Golkar, the second coalition, Gerindra, Democrat, PPP, Hanura, and the third coalition, PAN, PKB, and PKS.
- Sulawesi Island: in Central Sulawesi Province where there are two coalitions, the first coalition, PDIP, Gerindra, and the second coalition, Nasdem, Golkar, PKB, PKS, Democrat, Perindo, PAN, Hanura, PPP.

Based on these three examples, We argue that the differences in each coalition illustrate the differences in context and political dynamics between the national and regional levels. In addition, the candidates contesting in the nine provinces are very diverse, with three provinces having two candidates, five provinces having three candidates, and one province having four candidates in the 2020 gubernatorial election. Then, the coalition formed at the national level in 2019 was not encouraged to be implemented by political party administrators in each province. We used the specific criterion that is guided by coalition patterns observed in the 2019 Presidential Election, which involved two major coalitions. Based on this criterion, the provinces of Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan were chosen. Each of these provinces exhibited a similar coalition structure to the 2019 Presidential Election, with two main coalitions supporting two competing candidates in the 2020 Gubernatorial Election.

Some previous research shows that coalitions at the regional level in Indonesia are divided into several typologies, namely Small-Ideological Coalition, Small-Pragmatic Coalition, Large-Ideological Coalition, and Large-Pragmatic Coalition (Makhasin, 2016). Yet, the tendency of the coalition formed is a pragmatic coalition because they are oriented toward winning to gain power (Ekowati, 2019). In this context, pragmatic coalitions tend to be more tactical, taking into account the financial aspects and political networks of candidates (Azmi, 2017). On the other hand, the coalition is formally ratified through the authority of the central party board, which shows that the coalition formation tends to be dominated by the influence of central figures in central party boards (Fahmi, 2021).

Furthermore, Van Deemen (1991) identifies that political party coalitions can be formed into two distinct patterns based on the role of policy considerations. In the first pattern, political parties form coalitions without placing much importance on policy alignment. Meanwhile, the second pattern emphasizes policy alignment, in which parties are drawn together by shared ideological values and similar policy positions. Besides, Sened (1996) explains that the pattern of coalition formation can be analyzed based on their influence on policymaking and the strategic positions that coalition members expect to gain. This perspective supports the argument that political parties often adjust their political stances and attitudes to the variations of political dynamics in different regions. Instead, the political parties at the regional level tend to be more encouraged to optimize their chances of winning the local elections, rather than implementing the strategic agenda initiated by coalitions at the national level.

Therefore, this study aims to explain the causes of the formation of diverse coalitions in three provinces (South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi) in the 2020 Gubernatorial Elections, and which variables can explain the differences in coalitions formed in each region. We perceive the understanding of the coalition formation dynamics that contribute to the diverse coalition forms between the national and regional levels as an essential part of obtaining a deeper understanding of a multi-party system and decentralized governmental system like Indonesia has adopted. The way coalitions are formed in different contexts can reveal the broader orientation and strategies of political parties during regional elections and provide insights into the political development trajectory of the country. Thus, this research is expected to provide a meaningful contribution, especially within the field of electoral politics, by offering a nuanced perspective on how coalition dynamics operate within Indonesia's unique political framework.

Political coalitions are defined as the merger of two or more units and the use of resources together in response to conflict situations or coordination and cooperation to achieve certain goals (Hinckley, 1979). The phenomenon of political coalitions in democracies will continue to be an interesting topic to be discussed because the political process will continue to be dynamic along with political changes in a country.

The study of political coalitions has been widely studied by political scientists, such as the process of forming political coalitions (Sened, 1996), coalitions in the political system (Van Deemen, 1991), coalitions in government and parliament (Browne, 1971); (Schofield, 1995); (Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999), coalitions in multiethnic societies (Arriola, 2013), and conflicts in coalitions (Bowler, et al, 2016). These studies mostly explain coalition patterns after elections are held.

Meanwhile, there are several studies regarding political party coalitions discuss the coalition formation before the elections, such as discussions about the impact of coalitions on electoral, vote results, and voter perceptions (Falcó-Gimeno & Muñoz, 2017) (Gschwend, Meffert, & Stoetzer, 2017); (Klüver, & Spoon, 2020). Hence, the issue in these studies is different from previous studies, in which these studies examine the pattern of coalition formation in a multi-party country that implements a decentralized governmental system. However, this study still uses the theoretical footing of previous research to be able to build hypotheses that may be appropriate to explain the diverse and dynamic phenomenon of coalition formation in a multiparty state.

Several previous studies have tested theories of political coalitions, one of them is Browne (1971), who conducted a critical test of the theory of political coalitions. Browne (1971) explains that these theories in this field actively compete to explain and predict coalition formation outcomes within a given country. On the other hand, Giannetti & Sened (2004) criticize traditional approaches in coalition studies, arguing that both quantitative methods and abstract theoretical models often generate more questions than answers, especially in multi-party systems. Thus, the relevance of previous theoretical models needs to be re-examined to explain the development of reality in the formation of political party coalitions in multi-party systems.

The presence of coalitions in the political system begins with the assumption that each political party forms a coalition to control the opposition maximally (Van Deemen, 1991). In addition, Sened (1996) explains that coalition formation is a cooperative game that starts from the proportion of party votes after the election, which can then determine the policy positions to be determined. Sened (1996) also emphasizes that coalition modeling patterns can be seen based on the orientation of the coalition formation, such as the influence on the determination of policies and positions to be obtained. Policy and non-policy aspects are closely related to the interests of political parties in forming coalitions.

The above discussion illustrates that to be able to answer the problem of the diversity of coalitions formed in the regions still requires further study. Thus, this study maps several empirical studies to build a theoretical framework for explaining the differences in coalitions formed in the regions which are explained as follows:

- Informal Rules: Mershon (1994) explains that informal rules are the result of political bargaining or lobbying related to political positions, political access, and other informal agreements. Mershon (1994) argues that informal rules in coalition formation are an important factor because through this process political bargaining or lobbying occurs about political positions, political access, and other informal agreements. These informal rules arise because of the formal rules in the electoral system, informal rules are agreements between political parties that occur behind the political stage. In addition, informal rules are also hidden agreements between political parties that are not disclosed to the public.
- Ideological or policy orientation in coalition formation: Kreppel & Tsebelis (1999) argue that political party coalitions are formed because of ideology. In this context, ideology plays a major role in coalition formation, even if it contradicts ideology, political parties at the regional level may not follow party instructions at the central level. Thus, the influence of ideology determines which party to coalition with, especially regarding development programs and public policies that will be implemented after the election.
- The role of core parties in coalition formation: Giannetti & Sened (2004) argue that core parties play a major role in coalition formation. The core party in this context is a political party that has a strong influence in the region so other political parties tend to follow the party to win the election. This coalition is formed because the party has a greater chance of winning the election.
- Candidates: Caswell (2009) explains the role of candidates in coalition formation. Candidates in this context are figures who can attract sympathy from other parties and the public, in general, to

support them in elections. Candidates can attract support from other parties if they have resources, such as historical aspects, leadership, campaign strategies, and financing.

Based on the discussion above, differences in coalition formation can be seen from the tendency of coalitions to form pragmatically. Ideologically formed coalitions tend to be more consistent because they fight for policy issues. Variable ideologies, visions and missions, and programs become important aspects of coalition formation. Meanwhile, the conditions that generally occur are coalition inconsistencies which illustrate the tendency of political parties in the regions to form pragmatic coalitions that prioritize to win in elections. In the process, coalition diversity and inconsistency can be influenced by informal rules, core parties, and potential candidates. Thus, pragmatic coalitions have three variations, starting from informal rules that produce informal agreements so that they become the cause of coalition formation. Then, core parties that influence political positions win elections so that other parties are encouraged to join the core party. In addition, candidates whose the resources to win elections encourage political parties to support them in elections.

METHOD

This research focuses on examining coalition formation in the 2020 Governor Elections. Nine provinces were holding the 2020 Governor Elections, including Bengkulu Province, Jambi Province, West Sumatra Province, Riau Islands Province, South Kalimantan Province, Central Kalimantan Province, North Kalimantan Province, North Sulawesi Province, Central Sulawesi Province. However, this research limits the number of cases, based on considerations of effectiveness and manageable analysis in the research process. In the case selection process, we used the specific criterion that is guided by coalition patterns observed in the 2019 Presidential Election, which involved two major coalitions. Based on this criterion, the provinces of Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan were chosen. Each of these provinces exhibited a similar coalition structure to the 2019 Presidential Election, with two main coalitions supporting two competing candidates in the 2020 Gubernatorial Election.

Data were collected through historical tracing documented on several regional news portals. The news focused on issues in the formation of political party coalitions in endorsing candidates in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Province, Central Kalimantan Province, and South Kalimantan Province elections. In addition, this research uses the process tracing method so that researchers are encouraged to understand the history of an event, find path dependence, and produce causal explanations of the phenomenon under study. Pierson (2000) explains that path dependence is useful in understanding the process, and how past events affect future events so that researchers can produce causal mechanism arguments in a study. Then, Beach & Pederson (2013) explain that causal mechanism is more than explaining empirical events so that the resulting argument explains cause and effect.

Based on the table above, to produce a causal mechanism, the researcher must explain how the system works so that it can affect the outcome, and how an event can make changes to other events and produce the outcome under study. However, in this study, we used both the theoretical and empirical levels to obtain an adequate causal mechanism. At the theoretical level, this study argues that the differences and inconsistencies in coalitions that occurred in the Gubernatorial Election were influenced by informal rules, core parties, and candidates, making the coalitions formed tend to be pragmatic. While at the empirical level, the argument is explained in the findings section.

Then, technically, in the data analysis process, we followed Ricks and Liu (2018) who explain seven stages in process tracing, starting from identifying the hypothesis, establishing a timeline, constructing a causal graph, identifying choices, identifying counterfactual outcomes, finding evidence for the primary hypothesis, and finding evidence for the rival hypothesis. However, not all of these stages were applied in this study, we decided not to explain the counterfactual outcome so that the data analysis process stopped at the process of finding evidence for the primary hypothesis. Therefore, the data analysis process in this study begins with making a hypothesis, creating a timeline and constructing a causal graph, and finding evidence for the primary hypothesis. These processes illustrate hypothesis testing in this study.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Coalition Formation in the Central Sulawesi Governor Election 2020

The first province studied in this research is Central Sulawesi, in this province four parties dominate parliamentary seats based on the results of the 2019 Legislative Election, NasDem (15.6%), Golkar (15.6%), Gerindra (13.3%), and PDIP (13.3%). There were two coalitions in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election, the first was the Gerindra and PDIP coalition, which this coalition was endorsing Hidayat Lamakarate and Bartholomeus Tandigala. Both are former bureaucrats in Central Sulawesi Province. Specifically, Hidayat is the former Regional Secretary of Central Sulawesi Province, while Bartholomeus is the former Chief Executive of the BPBD (Regional Disaster Management Agency) of Central Sulawesi Province. However, this coalition received 40% of the votes and failed to win the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election.

Then, the second coalition consisted NasDem, Golkar, PKB, PKS, Democrat, Perindo, PAN, Hanura, and PPP. These nine parties endorsed Rusdy Mastura and Ma'mun Amir in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election. Rusdy is a Nasdem Party Executive who previously served as Mayor of Palu. Meanwhile, Ma'mun had previously served as a Member of DPD RI (Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia). This coalition succeeded in winning the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election with 60% of the vote.

In the 2020 Central Sulawesi Gubernatorial Election process, NasDem, Golkar, Gerindra, and PDIP have stronger bargaining power based on the number of seats in parliament. In addition, NasDem's appeal is greater than other parties because NasDem has a potential candidate to be nominated in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election, namely Rusdy Mastura. Meanwhile, Golkar, Gerindra, and PDIP did not have successful candidates to be nominated in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Gubernatorial Election. Golkar built a coalition with NasDem but did not nominate their cadres. Likewise, Gerindra and PDIP, are in coalition but nominate bureaucrats to contest. In this context, NasDem is better able to play the role of the core party because its bargaining power is greater than that of other parties. Thus, other parties tend to follow NasDem's political game in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election. This can be proven by the formation of a large coalition consisting of nine political parties in the NasDem coalition.

Then, another interesting thing to discuss in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election is the candidates carried by two coalitions. The first coalition carries party cadres from the core party, based on his track record Rusdy Mastura has served as mayor and has undergone regeneration in the NasDem Party. Meanwhile, the PDIP and Gerindra Coalition put forward the track record of a bureaucrat, Hidayat and Bartholomeus, both of them are bureaucrats who occupy strategic positions in the Central Sulawesi Provincial Government, especially Hidayat who previously served as Regional Secretary. This phenomenon also illustrates that there is a possibility of informal agreements between coalition parties and candidates so that candidates are willing to leave the peak of their career as bureaucrats in Central Sulawesi Province.

In addition, before the NasDem coalition was formed with a total of nine parties. There was another coalition that failed to meet the threshold and then joined the NasDem coalition. The coalition consisted of PAN and Democrat, the two parties wanted to carry their respective cadres, namely Anwar Hafid and Sigit Purnomo. However, they could not meet the threshold and failed to run the contestation of the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election. As a result, they gave their support to the NasDem coalition so that the coalition was even stronger. Their political decision tendencies can arise based on many factors, such as informal rules, candidate influence, and core party. The NasDem coalition may have developed informal rules between parties and candidates, especially in the process of winning candidates and after candidates have won the election. One of the weaknesses of process tracing is that it is difficult to trace evidence of informal agreements between political parties and candidates. Meanwhile, in the context of candidates and core parties, PAN and Democrat tend to consider candidates and coalitions that are more likely to win the election.

Based on the discussion above, the coalition pattern formed in Central Sulawesi Province shows the inconsistency of political party coalitions between the national and regional levels. This can be proven by the formation of two coalitions that are different from the national level. The variation that explains this difference is the strong role of the core party, namely NasDem. Furthermore, the amount of influence of candidates is based on their character, track record, and ability to influence the community. In addition, there tend to be informal agreements between parties and candidates so that two coalitions can be formed to contest the 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Election.

Coalition Formation in the Central Kalimantan Governor Election 2020

In the 2019 Legislative Election in Central Kalimantan, three political parties won the most seats: PDIP (26.7%), Golkar (15.6%), and the Democrat Party (13.3%). For the 2020 Central Kalimantan Governor Election, two coalitions were formed. The first coalition included the Democrat Party, Gerindra, and Hanura, which supported Ben Brahim S. Bahat and Ujang Iskandar. Ben, a former Golkar member and two-term Kapuas Regent, was not backed by Golkar for this election. Meanwhile, Ujang, a NasDem member and former Kotawaringin Regent, was his running mate. This coalition received 48.4% of the vote but did not win the election.

On the other hand, the second coalition consisted of PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB, PKS, Perindo, and PPP. PAN. The candidates were endorsed by this coalition are Sugianto Sabran and Edy Pratowo. Sugianto was an incumbent, previously the Governor of Central Kalimantan as well as a PDIP cadre. Meanwhile, Edy was previously the Regent of Pulang Pisau and also a Golkar cadre. This coalition succeeded in winning the 2020 Central Kalimantan Governor Election with 51.6% of the vote.

In the process, the coalition formation in the 2020 Central Kalimantan Governor Election showed several variations. First, Ben and Ujang were not cadres of the political parties that endorsed them. Ben is a Golkar cadre, while Ujang is a Nasdem cadre, and they were endorsed by Democrat, Gerindra, and Hanura. This means that in this context the tendency that emerged is the existence of informal agreements or informal rules in the candidacy process of Ben and Ujang. When their political parties did not provide recommendations, they looked for other parties to accommodate their interests in the 2020 Central Kalimantan Governor Election.

In addition, when looking at the second coalition pattern, the coalition consisted of eight parties. PDIP in this coalition could be said to be the core party that attracted other political parties to join their coalition due to its highest votes based on the 2019 Legislative Election. Interestingly, PKS joined this coalition alongside with PDIP. If we refer to coalition patterns at the national level, PDIP and PKS have never been in coalition between 2004 and 2019.

Moreover, PDIP's position as the core party is reinforced by Sugianto's position as the incumbent. In addition, Sugianto also claims that he comes from the majority tribe in Central Kalimantan so this is also one of the considerations in determining the bargaining power of candidates. The influence of incumbent candidates is seen as stronger in attracting political party support, just as Jokowi was able to attract more political party support than what he had obtained in the 2014 Presidential Election. Thus, in this context, the second coalition emerged due to the influence of the core party and the candidate.

Then, another interesting thing is the correlation between NasDem's support and Ujang's candidacy carried by the first coalition. In this context, the NasDem case is almost the same as the process of determining recommendations in PAN, previously PAN was rumored to join the first coalition but was constrained by the decision of the Central Party Board. In the case of NasDem, this party made the choice to join the PDIP coalition based on the considerations of party officials at the central level. This phenomenon, therefore, reflects another variation, where coalition formation is based more on the considerations of the Central Party Board than on political dynamics at the regional level.

Based on the discussion above, coalition formation in the 2020 Central Kalimantan Governor Election is based on several variations. First, the Ben and Ujang coalition tends to prioritize informal rules because in the process they are not part of the political party that endorsed them in the election. Thus, informal agreements can emerge between them, especially after the contestation Ben was exposed to a corruption case Second, the grand coalition that supports Sugianto was influenced by PDIP as the core party in this coalition, and there was also the influence of Sugianto as an incumbent candidate in the 2020 Central Kalimantan Governor Election. Third, PAN and NasDem changed the direction of their support based on the consideration of party administrators of the Central Party Board, so that this illustrates the involvement of political elites in determining candidate and coalition candidacy decisions.

Coalition Formation in the South Kalimantan Governor Election 2020

Based on the 2019 Legislative Elections in South Kalimantan Province, three political parties dominated the parliament consisted of Golkar (21.8%), PDIP (14.5%), and Gerindra (14.5%). Then, in the 2020 South Kalimantan Governor Election, there were two coalitions formed. The first coalition consisted of six parties, Golkar, PDIP, PAN, PKS, PKB, and NasDem. This coalition supports Sahbirin Noor and Muhidin in the

2020 South Kalimantan Governor Election. Sahbirin is the incumbent candidate, as well as the South Kalimantan Golkar Executive Board. Meanwhile, Muhidin is the former Mayor of Banjarmasin and PAN South Kalimantan Executive Board. This coalition succeeded in winning the 2020 South Kalimantan Governor Election with 51.7% of the vote.

The second coalition consists of Gerindra, PPP, and Democrat. This coalition endorsed Denny Indrayana and Difriadi. Denny was previously the Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights during the second term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration. Meanwhile, Difriadi was previously the Deputy Regent of Tanah Bumbu and a cadre of the Gerindra party. The coalition obtained 48.83% of the votes and failed to win the 2020 South Kalimantan Governor Election.

Based on the pattern of coalitions formed, the first coalition can be formed due to two factors: the core party and the candidate. Golkar in this coalition can be said to be the core party. Then, Sahbirin is an incumbent candidate who can attract support from other parties. Interestingly, Muhidin's selection was also based on his influence in PAN and his higher financial capability compared to the other candidates. Thus, the coalition was formed more influenced by considerations of candidates and financial resources. In this regard, it was rumored that PDIP and PPP would form a third axis, but this was not approved by the Central Party Board, and the final decision was to join the incumbent coalition. Therefore, the formation of this coalition also allowed for informal rules that could attract the support of other parties.

Furthermore, the second coalition was formed more based on Denny's figure influence. As a former Deputy Minister, Denny has good relations with several political elites, such as the Democrat Party and Gerindra Party elites. Denny's relationship with the Democrat Party may be quite strong because Denny held the position of Deputy Minister when the Democrat Party ruled the national government. Denny has access to political elites to get political party recommendations. Therefore, to strengthen support from other parties, and form a coalition in the 2020 South Kalimantan Governor Election, Denny chose a candidate from Gerindra.

In this context, the 2020 South Kalimantan Governor Election is dominated by the influence of candidates. The figure of the incumbent candidate is the main attraction in the formation of the first coalition. In addition, Muhidin's figure is also an attraction because he has financial resources in mobilizing coalition support. Meanwhile, in the second coalition, the candidate who was promoted as one of the indigenous people who succeeded in becoming one of the high-ranking state officials in the era of the Democratic Party in power.

The Inconsistence Political Situation and Coalition Formation

Dynamic coalition formation does not only occur at the national level, the inconsistencies that occur also have an impact on coalition formation at the regional level. The inconsistent political situation also illustrates the lack of integrated policies between the national and regional levels. Therefore, in facing local political events, political parties in the regions tend to be encouraged to strengthen their influence by winning legislative and executive elections. This context encourages political parties to prioritize victory over strategic policy issues. Thus, the coalition situation of political parties in the regions is also inconsistent with the coalition at the central level.

This research tries to place a sample that can be contextualized with the coalition formed at the central level in the 2019 Presidential Election. Therefore, the provinces of Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan were chosen to serve as empirical evidence in this study. Based on the research findings, the causal explanation of inconsistent coalitions that can lead to the formation of pragmatic coalitions is as follows:

Coalition Inconsistency	**Seeking for Potential Candidates:** -Incumbent -National or Local Figure -Political Access -Financial Capability	**Informal Rules:** -Financial commitment -Commitment to securing the Recommendation of the Central Board Party	**The Core Party:** -Number of seats in parliament -Ability to attract support from other parties -Political lobbying skills -Ability of internal cadres	**Pragmatic Coalition** (Winning and Office Seeking Orientation)

Inconsistency coalition can lead to the formation of pragmatic coalitions. In addition, another finding in this context is that there is a tendency for large coalitions to form if the candidate chosen is an incumbent and the party is the winner of the legislative election, as was the case at the national level, in Central Kalimantan and South Kalimantan Provinces. Thus, in this context, winning parties and incumbent candidates can influence political parties' decisions in determining coalitions.

This research strengthens the argument that the determination of coalitions in the regions is increasingly undemocratic and more centralized. Budi (2020) explains that the role of party administrators at the Central Party Board in providing recommendations determines the recruitment and candidacy process. The recommendation letter has an impact on the determination of political party coalitions in the regions, if the central party board recommends a name that is different from what is proposed by the management in the regions, then political parties in the regions can only follow these instructions so that this phenomenon can cause a person to easily change political party membership.

As previously discussed, we assume that political parties in Indonesia largely function as "electoralist" parties, where their primary focus is on winning elections rather than advancing consistent ideological or policy agendas (Aminuddin & Ramadlan, 2015). This electoralist orientation pushes parties to form pragmatic, often short-term coalitions aimed solely at securing immediate victories in electoral contests. Consequently, regional political alliances in Indonesia tend to be fluid and opportunistic, reflecting a willingness to shift allegiances based on short-term electoral interests. This dynamic illustrates the unique ways in which political parties navigate multiparty system and Indonesia's decentralization system, where regional success can often hinge on pragmatic coalition-building.

On the other hand, the Indonesian political party behaviors demonstrate what Ambardi (2009) identifies as a cartelization strategy where political parties are largely driven by pragmatic survival strategies and prioritize access to power over ideological consistency. The cross-ideological coalitions also known as the manifestation of political cartel behavior. In these coalitions, ideological differences are minimized as parties collectively manage their newfound shared interests. Ambardi perceives that the pragmatic approach of the coalition formation stems from the need for financial support for operating political parties, while most political parties struggle to fund themselves independently. Due to this financial constraint, political parties increasingly engage in rent-seeking—using government positions and state resources to secure funds and benefits (Solihah, 2016), to continue their survival within the political realm that is an inevitable choice for political parties.

Furthermore, some candidates in this study were not cadres from the political parties that endorsed them in the 2020 Gubernatorial Election, which it is signaling that parties overlooked regeneration mechanisms in their internal system. Current Indonesian political parties start to deprioritize their parties' regeneration in order to win and to obtain power over contestation (Rosanti, 2020). In this case, it would hinder the best cadres from the candidacy which raises important questions about the future of party-based democracy in Indonesia. Whereas, the regeneration mechanisms within the candidacy political party system are essential for cultivating capable leadership as well as maintaining loyalty within the party structure. Moreover, the shift towards externally sourced candidates risks narrowing opportunities for the best cadres, potentially discouraging active involvement and commitment from party members who may feel overlooked.

CONCLUSION

Political party coalitions in Indonesia generally tend to show inconsistency, so the coalition formation in the regions also tends to illustrate pragmatic rather than ideological coalitions. Pragmatic coalitions are more oriented towards victory and other benefits that will be obtained after the election. The coalition patterns formed in Central Sulawesi Province, Central Kalimantan Province, and South Kalimantan Province show the inconsistency of political party coalitions between the national and the regional level.

In the coalition formation process in Central Sulawesi Province, NasDem became the core party. Considerations in determining candidates are based on their character, track record, and ability to influence the community. Then, coalition formation in Central Kalimantan was more based on informal rules because in the process there were candidates who were not part of political parties but could get recommendations. In addition, PDIP is the core party, and there is also the influence of Sugianto as the incumbent candidate. After that, coalition formation in South Kalimantan was dominated by the influence of candidates. Thus,

there are various variations in pragmatic coalition formation, such as being influenced by candidates, informal rules, or the core party.

Methodologically, to complement the limitations in applying process tracing in this study, I recommend future research use alternative hypotheses and counterfactual arguments so that the resulting causal mechanism argument can be stronger. Furthermore, other researchers can also use other methods, such as in-depth interviews in the data collection process to obtain primary data. Different methods may produce different arguments and may be able to criticize the results of this study. In addition, other studies could also increase the number of cases and examine coalition formation at the district or city level. I believe research on coalition formation at the regional level can be developed by recontextualizing the findings of this study to regent or mayor elections in Indonesia.

Such integration is important in building development effectiveness and minimizing differences in orientation and priorities between the central government and local governments. Although, Indonesia applies decentralization and each region has the right to determine who its political leaders are, at least each political party at the central and regional levels can have an integrated platform. The integration of the platform can become a symbol and identity of political parties when building coalitions and contesting elections. The platform can also encourage people to pay more attention to policy issues and ideas of political parties in developing the country rather than only considering the popularity of candidates or vote buying. Weak political platforms and differences in orientation between the center and the regions cause political parties in the regions to tend to be oriented towards victory only without considering strategic aspects of governance.

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